![]() ![]() A suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent. The district court dismissed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of claims against the Tribe and against individual defendants in their official capacity, but dismissed claims against defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice on the ground that Stanko failed to exhaust his tribal remedies: “The district court properly dismissed Stanko’s claims against individual tribal officers acting in their official capacities as also barred by the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. § 1983 and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), for actions arising out of his arrest by tribal officers, including alleged battery and theft. ![]() 2019), Stanko, a non-Indian, sued the Oglala Sioux Tribe and various tribal officers under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2019 WL 846573 (8th Cir. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribe did not waive its tribal sovereign immunity.” Tribal sovereign immunity can be waived by litigation conduct, but not by the litigation conduct of a tribe’s alter ego or agent, and the litigation conduct of filing a bankruptcy petition does not waive tribal sovereign immunity as to a separate, adversarial fraudulent transfer claim. We agree with the first step of the Trustee’s analysis, but we disagree with the second and third steps. If each step is a correct statement of the law, then, according to the Trustee, the Tribe may have waived its immunity from the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claim by actually or effectively filing the Debtors’ bankruptcy petitions in federal court. … The Trustee’s argument that the Tribe clearly waived any tribal sovereign immunity it possessed has three analytical steps: (1) Indian tribes can waive sovereign immunity by litigation conduct, (2) alter egos or agents of Indian tribes can waive tribal sovereign immunity by litigation conduct, and (3) filing a bankruptcy petition waives sovereign immunity as to separate, adversarial fraudulent transfer claims. We heed those warnings, and hold that Congress did not unequivocally express an intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress did not waive tribal sovereign immunity through Section 106(a) and that the Tribe Defendants had not waived immunity through their actions: “A proper respect both for tribal sovereignty and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent. The court rejected the Trustee’s argument that the Memphis Biofuels principles did not apply to a claim sounding in tort. Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the Memphis Biofuels case, the court had rejected the Trustee’s argument that, absent a resolution waiving immunity or a contractual waiver, the Tribe Defendants waived immunity by their conduct. ![]() Later, the court held that the Tribe Defendants had not themselves waived their immunity. § 106(a), which abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental units” under certain enumerated sections of the Bankruptcy Code, did not waive tribal sovereign immunity. ![]() The district court had previously concluded that 11 U.S.C. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians and its political subdivision, Kewadin Casinos Gaming Authority (Tribe Defendants). 2019), the trustee in an adversary action within bankruptcy proceedings sought to void as fraudulent a restructuring and financing transaction whereby the bankruptcy debtor, Greektown Holdings, LLC, directly or indirectly transferred money to multiple parties, including the Sault Ste. In the case of In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 2019 WL 922658 (6th Cir. ![]()
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